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introduction
On saturday, 27 decemBer 2008, israel commenced operation cast lead, a military operation directed against targets Within the 360 km² gaza strip. The 
first phase of the operation consisted of aerial bombardment. 
Then, on 3 January 2009, Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”) 
launched a ground invasion. The operation ceased on 18 January 
2009 following unilateral declarations of ceasefire, first by 
Israel and then Hamas. By then more than 1,400 Palestinians 
had been killed, approximately 700–900 of whom were esti-
mated by human rights organizations to be non-combatants. 
Hamas rocket attacks against southern Israeli towns killed thir-
teen Israeli civilians.
This note does not opine on what precipitated Operation Cast 
Lead or who was to blame for starting it, nor does it offer defini-
tive conclusions regarding the lawfulness of the military opera-
tions of either side. The aim, rather, is to identify the contours 
of the legal framework in which the events of 27 December–18 
January can be assessed.
As the claim has been made that Operation Cast Lead was 
preceded and precipitated by a breach of the jus ad bellum, i.e., 
an act of aggression, the paper begins with a brief discussion 
of the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, i.e., 
international humanitarian law (IHL). It then examines whether 
the events of 27 December–18 January can be characterized as 
an armed conflict and, if so, which kind; who are the parties; 
and what is the applicable law. The piece concludes by offering 
some preliminary remarks on certain aspects of the conduct of 
the hostilities, which raise prima facie concerns.
Jus ad bellum and itS reLationSHip witH Jus in bello
Israel and Hamas have accused each other of committing 
acts of aggression, and characterized their respective responses 
as acts of self-defense. In several statements, Israel has claimed 
that Operation Cast Lead was an exercise of its right to self-
defense, offering as evidence of Hamas’s aggression its rocket 
attacks on Israel and refusal to extend the June 2008 truce. 
Hamas, in turn, has cited as evidence of Israeli aggression the 
fact that in November 2008 Israel sent soldiers into the Gaza 
Strip to destroy a tunnel, which it said Hamas was using to 
smuggle weapons into the territory. During that operation, Israel 
killed six people. Hamas claimed these actions breached its 
truce with Israel and responded by firing more than 35 rockets 
into Israel. Declaring that these rocket attacks breached the 
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Participants during the ninth Special Session of the Human Rights Council concerning the situation in Gaza.
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truce, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead with the averred 
intention of stopping the rocket attacks.
An examination of the credibility of the respective claims 
of self-defense, and the myriad legal issues arising from them, 
exceeds the scope of this contribution. In any event, in order to 
assess the lawfulness of their use of force under jus in bello, it is 
not necessary to determine whether or not Israel or Hamas com-
mitted an act of aggression, whether either of them had a right of 
self-defense, or whether any such right was exercised lawfully or 
might itself have violated jus ad bellum. Here, it is only impor-
tant to recall that while jus ad bellum and jus in bello are related 
bodies of law insofar as both are concerned with regulating the 
use of armed force, jus in bello remains autonomous from jus 
ad bellum.
The converse is not, however, the case: where an initial use 
of force is sufficient to trigger an armed conflict, the legality of 
the initial and all subsequent uses of force must be determined 
under the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It is conceivable 
that a particular use of force could be lawful under jus ad bellum 
and yet unlawful under jus in bello, and it is equally possible that 
an unlawful resort to force could comport with the laws of war. 
Moreover, even a state (or potentially a non-state actor) with a 
right of self-defense could exercise it in such a way as to breach 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello, for example by using force that 
was disproportionate under jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Israel has conflated the two bodies of law: it has countered 
accusations that it was in breach of jus in bello with claims that 
it was acting in self-defense. Parties to an armed conflict are 
not absolved of their duty to comply with the laws of war even 
where a right to self-defense exists. Equally, a breach of jus ad 
bellum (or indeed jus in bello) by an opposing party does not 
justify or excuse breaches of jus in bello.
tHe exiStence of an armed confLict and itS 
cHaracter, tHe partieS and tHe appLicaBLe Law
It would undeniably be desirable to characterize the situation 
in Gaza during the three weeks of Operation Cast Lead as an 
armed conflict, in order to ensure that the civilian population of 
Gaza could benefit from the widest possible protection of inter-
national law. The law of armed conflict aims primarily to protect 
civilian populations from the worst effects of hostilities. The 
law imposes obligations on the parties to conduct their military 
operations so as to minimize impact on persons who are not par-
ticipants and on civilian objects, including basic infrastructure.
Yet, it would be rash to automatically assume the existence 
of an armed conflict in this case, or to presuppose the character 
of any such conflict. As this section indicates, while there are 
legal arguments supporting the existence of an armed conflict, 
there are also legal obstacles to characterizing the hostilities as 
either one of the two types of armed conflict recognized by IHL: 
an international armed conflict or a non-international armed 
conflict.
While not every breach of jus ad bellum by one state against 
another automatically results in an international armed conflict, 
any resulting armed conflict would be deemed international. 
The character of an armed conflict preceded by an armed attack 
involving a state actor and a non-state actor, however, is not 
obvious. The character of an armed conflict resulting from the 
use of force by a state against a territory, which it occupies, but 
which was not previously sovereign, is also ambiguous.
no armed confLict took pLace
The first possibility is that no armed conflict took place in 
Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009. Whether 
or not there was a breach of jus ad bellum by Hamas or Israel 
before the launching of Operation Cast Lead, it can be argued 
that any such breach did not trigger an armed conflict under 
the law. While force which was separate and distinct from the 
force regulated by jus ad bellum was used by Israel and various 
Palestinian non-state actors, such use of force had a legal char-
acter other than armed conflict.
internationaL armed confLict
The second possibility is to consider that the situation during 
the three-week period in question was an armed conflict of an 
international character. Several legal arguments can be offered 
to support this view.
The first is that Palestine is a state, albeit one that has not 
been universally recognized. This view is not without some legal 
justification. Whether one applies the criteria of statehood set 
out in the Montevideo Convention or the more widely accepted 
constitutive theory of statehood, Palestine might be considered a 
state. With regard to the Montevideo criteria, Palestine has a per-
manent population; defined territory, albeit one whose borders 
It would undeniably be desirable to characterize the 
situation in Gaza during the three weeks of Operation 
Cast Lead as an armed conflict, in order to ensure that the 
civilian population of Gaza could benefit from the widest 
possible protection of international law.
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are disputed (but this is true for many states); a government; and 
some capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even if 
the more onerous constitutive theory is applied, Palestine might 
be considered a state as it has been recognized by almost 100 
states, including two Security Council members. This is far more 
than have recognized Kosovo, for example. In 1998 the Palestine 
National Council proclaimed the State of Palestine, but this 
could be regarded as much a political act as a legal one.
Arguments against the existence of a Palestinian state include 
that its control over its own borders is limited, as is its capacity 
to enter into international relations. In addition, its existence as 
a state is hotly disputed, including by the majority of Security 
Council members. The search for a two-state solution suggests 
that the existence of a Palestinian state is an aspiration rather 
than a fact.
An alternative possibility would be to argue that the con-
flict was international on the basis of Article 1(4) of 1977 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I). Article 1(4) extends the application of the law of 
international armed conflict to situations that are not traditional 
armed conflicts between two states but ones in which ‘peoples 
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination, . . .’1 The problem with this approach is, even if a 
Palestinian right of self-determination is recognized—and there 
is widespread support for this view, not the least of which is the 
acknowledgement, even by Israel, of a two state solution—the 
customary law status of Article 1(4) is disputed.
A third argument is that the events between 27 December and 
18 January were just the latest phase in an ongoing international 
armed conflict, which did not end with the June 2008 truce.
non-internationaL armed confLict
If the situation in Gaza between 27 December and 18 January 
cannot be considered an international armed conflict, this does 
not imply that by default it must be a non-international armed 
conflict. According to common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, a non-international armed conflict takes place on 
the territory of a High Contracting Party.
The situation in this case is unusual insofar as the Gaza Strip 
(and the OPT as a whole) is not a High Contracting Party to 
the Geneva Conventions (although the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization did try to accede to the Conventions), nor is it the 
territory of a High Contracting Party. Even if it is occupied ter-
ritory—an assertion, which Israel disputes—that does not make 
it Israeli territory. While common Article 3 does not elaborate on 
the conditions precedent to the existence of a non-international 
armed conflict, the Commentary thereon of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) does identify some pos-
sible criteria.
Amongst the ICRC criteria that could be problematic in this 
case is a requirement that “the Party in revolt against the de jure 
Government possesses an organized military force, an authority 
responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory 
and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the 
Convention.”2 Israel is not the de jure government of the Gaza 
Strip even if it remains the de jure occupying power, and while 
Hamas clearly has an organized military arm it is not organized 
along the lines of a regular military force but in a more cellular 
manner. Notwithstanding such legal obstacles, it does not seem 
unreasonable to consider the conflict to have been at least a non-
international armed conflict to which common Article 3 applied, 
bearing in mind the view of the ICRC Commentary that ‘the 
scope of application of the article must be as wide as possible,’3 
and that the criteria offered to distinguish armed conflict from 
mere acts of banditry are suggestive only.
The situation was certainly factually distinguishable from a 
riot or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection. If the situa-
tion can be considered a conflict at all, arguably at a minimum, 
common Article 3 can apply without having to determine the 
exact nature of the conflict, given that the Article applies to all 
armed conflicts regardless of their character. And, as already 
noted, it would be in the interest of the civilian population of 
Gaza to consider the law of armed conflict as the main legal 
paradigm regulating the conduct of Operation Cast Lead and the 
military operations conducted by Hamas, inter alia.
wHo are tHe partieS?
Determining the parties here might seem obvious—Israel 
and Hamas. But, the issue is more complex than that. On the 
one side, there seems to have been one state party: Israel. On 
the other side, there is at least one prima facie non-state actor: 
Hamas. Hamas, however, is not the only armed group operat-
ing on the territory of Gaza. Others include Islamic Jihad, 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Some of these 
groups claimed responsibility for some of the rockets fired at 
Israel. The relationships between them and Hamas will have 
to be legally determined in ascertaining the responsibility of 
Hamas for hostile acts carried out against Israel from the terri-
tory of Gaza.
protection of tHe civiLian popuLation
The applicable IHL will depend on how the conflict is char-
acterized. Yet, regardless of whether any conflict is found to be 
international or non-international in character, protection of the 
civilian population from the worst effects of the hostilities would 
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be legally guaranteed. For example, the direct targeting of the 
civilian population and the use of indiscriminate and dispro-
portionate force are equally prohibited under the law applicable 
in either international or non-international armed conflict, as a 
matter of treaty and/or customary law.
As noted by the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal in 
the Tadic Case,4 a “gradual extension to internal armed conflict 
of rules and principles concerning international wars has also 
occurred as regards means and methods of warfare” [empha-
sis in the original].5 Moreover, the 2005 study by the ICRC of 
customary IHL found that almost all of the rules regulating the 
conduct of hostilities in an international armed conflict also 
apply in non-international conflicts.6 The customary law status 
of all of the important rules, especially the principle of distinc-
tion between combatants and civilians, means they would bind 
Israel even where it is not a party to them.
Also applicable during an armed conflict, as lex generalis to 
IHL’s lex specialis, are those parts of human rights law that have 
not been derogated from.7
aSpectS of tHe conduct of tHe HoStiLitieS  
raiSing Prima Facie concernS
The high civilian death toll of the hostilities provoked 
calls for an independent investigation. Charges of violations 
of humanitarian law, and even war crimes, have been leveled 
against both sides. It would be premature for this short contribu-
tion to pronounce on the issue, but it is salient to identify some 
aspects of the conduct of the hostilities giving rise to particular 
concerns. Almost all of the potential violations are of the prin-
ciple of distinction, combined with the principle of precaution. 
Here, space permits reference to three aspects of the conduct of 
the hostilities which raise red flags: the deliberate targeting of 
protected civilians and civilian objects; indiscriminate attacks, 
including the disproportionate use of force; and, the use of 
human shields.
deLiBerate targeting of protected civiLianS
Both Israel and Hamas have tacitly admitted to prima facie 
deliberate targeting of civilians enjoying the presumption of 
protection under IHL. Israel claimed the primary objective of 
Operation Cast Lead was to destroy Hamas’s ‘infrastructure of 
terror’. To this end, the IDF targeted not only people and objects 
that are military objectives by nature, such as members of armed 
groups and weapons stores, but also persons employed as part 
of the Hamas civilian infrastructure, in particular the police 
and police stations. A particularly controversial example of this 
was Israel’s missile strikes on police headquarters in Gaza City 
during a graduation ceremony for cadets. Israel has also made 
clear its policy to target anyone who held a leadership position 
within Hamas.
Hamas also attacked non-combatants. On its website, it has 
claimed responsibility for firing rockets and mortars against 
mostly military objectives (in the main, military bases but also 
‘Zionist soldiers’) but also at Israeli civilians.8
Prima facie, IHL divides the population into two groups, 
namely combatants and non-combatants (civilians), and only a 
person who is a combatant is targetable at all times during an 
armed conflict. Anyone who is not a combatant is by default a 
civilian, and such a person enjoys immunity from attack, unless 
and for such time as he takes a direct part in hostilities.9
It is obvious, though, that IHL implicitly distinguishes 
between four categories of persons for the purposes of targeting, 
of which two consist of members of organized armed forces. 
These two are (1) combatants who are members of states’ armed 
forces and (2) ‘quasi’ or so-called unlawful combatants who in 
relation to non-international armed conflicts are members of the 
organized armed forces referred to in common Article 3 or the 
‘dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups’ men-
tioned in Article 1 of Additional Protocol II. For the purposes 
of targeting, arguably the members of category 2 can be assimi-
lated with the lawful combatants in category 1, i.e., they can 
be targeted at all times, unless they are hors de combat or have 
lain down their arms. The third category (3) consists of civilians 
who take a direct part in hostilities; and the fourth category (4) 
contains civilians who do not take a direct part in hostilities. 
The civilians in category (3) are targetable only if and when 
they are preparing for, carrying out or returning from an act of 
direct participation in hostilities. The members of category (4) 
are never directly targetable, although some casualties among 
this category are acceptable during a lawful attack on a military 
objective provided they are not disproportionate in relation to 
the military necessity of the strike.
The lawfulness of targeting anyone will thus depend on 
which category they fall into and what they were actually doing 
at the time they were targeted. Thus, a major challenge for any 
person or body charged with investigating potential war crimes 
carried out in Gaza during the period in question by either side 
will be to determine whether the persons (and objects) targeted 
were in fact lawful military objectives and, in particular, whether 
persons enjoying the presumption of protection had in fact lost 
it, either through being combatant members of organized armed 
groups or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.
From the perspective of Israel’s strikes, the controversy 
really concerns members of Hamas other than persons with a 
permanent military function. This includes persons who might 
have had a civilian function within the organization, and persons 
who exercised some form of state or semi-state but non-military 
function for the administration, without necessarily being 
members of Hamas. Operation Cast Lead clearly targeted the 
Hamas civilian as well as military infrastructure. This meant 
that many of the soft (personnel) targets were enjoyed at least 
the presumption of protection. The onus was therefore on Israel 
to ascertain in each and every case whether the person or object 
targeted had lost its protected status. Here, it should be noted 
that, prima facie, a police station by its nature is not a military 
objective, and it could only be transformed into one if through 
its location, purpose or use it made an effective contribution to 
military action and if its total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances at the time, offered a defi-
nite military advantage.10
As far as the Hamas strikes are concerned, prima facie its 
direct attacks on IDF forces or objects or against Israeli civil-
ians participating in hostilities would not be prohibited under 
IHL. However, its attacks against protected Israeli civilians not 
participating in hostilities would constitute a prima facie viola-
tion of IHL.
indiScriminate attackS
The hostilities provoked allegations of indiscriminate attacks 
by both sides. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited by both 
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conventional and customary IHL applicable in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts.11 Most suspect incidents 
seem to have combined a lack of discrimination with a lack of 
precaution, as required under Article 57 and 58 of Additional 
Protocol I. Examples include the manner in which white phos-
phorous was used by the IDF, and Qassam or Grad rockets 
used by Hamas. Although the use of white phosphorous is not 
prohibited but only restricted under Protocol III to the 1980 
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, it was deployed by 
Israel against objects enjoying the presumption of protection 
(e.g., schools) and in a manner which did not seem to comport 
with the principle of precaution in attack and of protection of 
civilians against the effects of attacks. Hamas and other armed 
groups launched unguided rockets at Israel with no apparent 
concern for where they would land.
Disproportionate use of force is a type of indiscriminate 
attack. Under IHL, a disproportionate attack is one “which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage anticipated.”12 A disturbing aspect of Operation Cast Lead 
were the on-the-record threats by several Israeli political leaders 
that disproportionate force would be used in Gaza. Such assertions 
are not in themselves proof that disproportionate attacks were in 
fact carried out: proportionality must be judged and measured in 
relation to each and every attack. However, where disproportionate 
uses of force can indeed be shown, such statements may serve as 
evidence of criminal intent. What needs to be stressed is that the 
proportionality of an attack is measured in relation to its military 
necessity. Proportionality is not based on any equivalence of num-
bers injured or killed between the parties.
uSe of Human SHieLdS
Amongst myriad other aspects of the hostilities arousing con-
cerns are accusations by each side against the other of the use 
of human shields to discourage targeting of military objectives. 
Israel claims that the higher Palestinian casualties are partially 
attributable to Hamas’s use of human shields. While it is prema-
ture to pronounce on the veracity of these allegations, it is worth 
noting that as a legal argument regarding proportionality, this 
is unfounded. The use of human shields by a party to an armed 
conflict is a violation of IHL and a war crime in both interna-
tional and non-international armed conflicts.13 Yet, it in no way 
relieves the opposing side of its responsibility to factor this into 
its proportionality calculations and to take all necessary precau-
tions to minimize harm to the civilian population.14
concLuSion
Civilians were not the only casualties of this three-week war. 
Throughout the conflict over Palestine, and no less so during 
Operation Cast Lead, both sides have waged a fierce propaganda 
war. Among the misrepresentations of IHL propagated during 
Operation Cast Lead were the following: an act of aggression 
justifies or at least excuses violations of IHL; the obligation to 
observe IHL is subject to reciprocity—that one party may not 
have observed the principle of distinction allows the other party 
to ignore it; and difficulties in distinguishing between persons 
who participate in hostilities and those who do not relieves a 
party from the obligation to give persons enjoying the presump-
tion of civilian status the benefit of the doubt.
The military operations that took place in the Gaza Strip 
demonstrated the difficulties of compliance with IHL in asym-
metrical wars, but also the acute necessity of doing so. The foun-
dational principles of IHL that ensure the protection of civilians 
caught in the middle of armed conflicts took a severe beating in 
this conflict. In order to restore the rule of IHL, it will be neces-
sary for some of the potential violations of IHL to be impartially 
investigated and for those responsible to be held criminally 
responsible. The price of doing nothing is diminution of the value 
of IHL in protecting civilians during armed conflicts.  HRB
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